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Abstract 
 
This article explores the expression of State sovereignty through customary norms in a 
regulatory space dominated by investment treaties. It argues that, because most of the 
actionable concepts expressing sovereignty in international law are general (not specific to a 
“branch”) and customary, misunderstanding the role of customary law in investment 
regulation amounts to confining sovereignty to a few narrow carve-outs and exceptions in 
investment treaties. However, customary concepts operate autonomously and in parallel to 
treaties, unless specifically excluded by the latter. The lex specialis principle does not 
necessarily command the exclusion in toto of relevant customary rules. The article discusses 
the work of the Institut de Droit International in this regard and then analyses the investment 
case law relating to the application of the police powers doctrine, necessity, countermeasures 
and transnational public policy. It shows that failure to address specifically the articulation 
of treaty and customary norms even in the event the former apply as lex specialis is subtly 
eroding, without clear legal grounds, the customary expression of sovereignty in foreign 
investment disputes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One peculiar feature of the body of scholarship on international investment law and 
arbitration is that, despite the considerable amount of published material, some major 
questions remain underexplored. In this context, the 2013 Resolution of the Institut de Droit 
International (IDI) on the Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor against the 
Authorities of the Host State under Inter-State Treaties1 is very welcome, as it identifies, for 	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1 Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor against the Authorities of the Host State under 
Inter-State Treaties, Resolution of 13 September 2013, Tokyo Session (“Resolution”); Legal Aspects of 
Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor against the Authorities of the Host State under Inter-State Treaties, 
Report of A. Giardina, 18th Commission, Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, Tokyo Session 2013 – 
Draft Works (“Report”); Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor against the Authorities of the 
Host State under Inter-State Treaties, Travaux préparatoires, 18th Commission (membership: Alexandrov, 
Audit, Bastid-Burdeau, Collins, Dominicé, El-Kosheri, Fadlallah, Lalive, Lankosz, Lowenfeld, Mayer, Orrego 
Vicuña, Ranjeva, Remiro Brotons, Ress, Schwebel, Subedi, Sucharitkul, Treves and Vinuesa), Yearbook of the 
Institute of International Law, Tokyo Session 2013 – Draft Works (“Travaux préparatoires”) (this document 
consists of the deliberations of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) at the sessions of Naples (2009), Rhodes 
(2011), and the preparatory works for the Tokyo session, including the “Questionnaire” prepared by the 
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many highly debated issues, what the distinguished group of scholars composing the IDI see 
as a consensual solution. Yet, the Resolution has left several issues unresolved and others 
unexplored. The study of the main documents leading to this Resolution gives an external 
observer the impression that at least two reasons account for the remaining lacunae. One 
concerns the significant challenges involved in reaching a consensus on many issues. An 
indication of this is the increasingly narrow scope of the issues addressed as one moves from 
the initial to the final stages of the codification work. The other is perhaps more prosaic but 
no less significant for present purposes. Some questions were framed throughout the process 
from a perspective – that of special regimes – which has become so common that we tend to 
lose sight of what it fails to capture. My purpose in the next paragraphs is to discuss one issue 
that has received scant attention in investment law scholarship and which is, in my view, of 
great importance: the customary expression of sovereignty in international investment 
regulation. 
The starting point of my analysis is a basic observation that I have tried to develop at 
some length elsewhere2 namely that many, if not most, of the legal concepts expressing 
sovereignty in international law are of a general and customary nature. Legal concepts such as 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources,3 immunities,4 the police powers doctrine,5 
necessity6 or some pro-sovereignty presumptions7 are applicable not only in the context of 
investment disputes but also more broadly in other contexts. Because sovereignty concerns all 
areas of international law, many of the legal concepts expressing it have a general (by contrast 
with a branch-specific) scope. As such, they are grounded on general international law and, 
more specifically, on customary norms. For this reason, analysing the relationship between 
investment treaties and customary international law is an important step for the understanding 
of the room for sovereignty in investment regulation. This basic and yet important point has 
been neglected, including by the work of the IDI. To be fair, although the Resolution does not 
make reference to this question, the interactions between investment treaties and customary 
international law were a major concern of the Rapporteur, and they were discussed to some 
extent at the 18th Commission. Yet, the focus of the discussion was not on the customary 	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meeting of 19-21 June 2013). 
2 See VIÑUALES, “Sovereignty in Foreign Investment Law”, in DOUGLAS, PAUWELYN and VIÑUALES 
(eds.), The Foundations of International Investment Law, Oxford, 2014, p. 317 ff. 
3 See Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN Doc. A/RES/1803/XVII, 14 December 1962 
(“Resolution 1803”); and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports, 2005, p. 168, para. 244. 
4 For a contemporary statement of the law on immunities see YANG, State Immunity in International Law, 
Cambridge, 2012. Three relatively recent cases show the scope of immunities: Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports, 2002, p. 3 ff.; 
“Ara Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Request for the prescription of provisional measures, ITLOS Case 
No. 20, Order of 15 December 2012; and Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece 
intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports, 2012, p. 99 ff. 
5 See American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of the Law of Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1965, Section 197(1)(a); American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1986, Section 712, commentary, letter (g); SOHN and BAXTER, “Draft Convention on the 
International Legal Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens”, AJIL, 1961, p. 545 ff. Relevant cases are 
identified and discussed later in this article. 
6 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res. 56/83, UN Doc. A/Res/ 56/83, 12 
December 2001 (“ILC Articles”), Art. 25. Relevant cases are identified and discussed later in this article. 
7 See, e.g., SS Wimbledon, PCIJ, Judgment, 17 August 1923, Series A, No. 1, 24-25; SS Lotus, PCIJ, 
Judgment, 7 September 1927, Series A, No. 10, 18; and Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 
PCIJ, Judgment, 7 June 1932, Series A/B, No. 46, 167. 
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expression of sovereignty, which was eventually dealt with in the narrower context of 
expropriation clauses.8 
The purpose of this article is to draw the attention of commentators and practitioners to 
the implications, for the expression of sovereignty, of approaching investment regulation 
through a predominantly treaty-based prism. Disregarding customary international law 
beyond basic references to the law of treaties or the law of State responsibility amounts 
indeed to disregarding the main legal concepts expressing the idea of sovereignty. The current 
trend, noted in the Rapporteur’s Report, towards including more regulatory leeway in specific 
treaty clauses9 is not an appropriate solution because it still confines sovereignty to a few 
exceptions or at best carve-outs instead of recognising that, much in the same way as the 
necessity defence does not need to be incorporated in a treaty to operate, the same is true of 
other customary expressions of sovereignty. After a brief discussion of how the interactions 
between investment treaties and customary international law were framed in the work of the 
IDI (section 2), I will turn to the analysis of four customary concepts that may operate 
autonomously and in parallel to investment treaties (section 3). By conducting this exercise, I 
will attempt to show how excessive emphasis on treaties as a lex specialis may be subtly 
eroding the room for customary law investment regulation and, thereby, the legitimate 
expression of sovereignty. 
 
 
2. CUSTOMARY LAW AND INVESTMENT REGULATION IN THE IDI PROCEEDINGS 
 
The heading of this section uses the conjunction “and” instead of the preposition “in” 
used in the title of this article to highlight a difference of approach with the work of the IDI. 
The nuance is easy to understand. Whereas “in” implies that customary law plays or should 
play a role in investment regulation, “and” has no particular target question and allows for 
different understandings of the link between customary law and investment regulation. This is 
only natural for a codification effort such as the one attempted by the IDI, which must 
endeavour to frame the topic broadly, at least initially. Yet, as I will show in the next 
paragraphs, the work of the IDI did approach this question broadly at the beginning but as it 
further refined its contours, the references to sovereignty were increasingly marginalised and 
eventually lost in the final Resolution. Here, I would like to inverse the order of the analysis 
by looking first at the Resolution, then at the final Report of the Rapporteur and then to the 
earlier discussions of the 18th Commission, including those prompted by the questionnaire 
circulated by the Rapporteur. My analysis will only focus on the link between customary law 
and investment treaties, and not on the other topics addressed in the IDI’s codification work, 
some of which are covered by other articles in this volume. 
The Resolution does not address specifically the relationship between treaty law and 
customary law. One can find, however, one explicit reference to it in connection with the 
interpretation and application of treaties “in accordance with the general rules of international 
law reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” (Article 1).10 It is, of course, a 
truism to state that the customary rules on treaty law apply to the operation, including the 
application and interpretation, of (investment) treaties. But, for present purposes, this basic 
statement has two implications. First, it makes no doubt that the interpretation rules reflected 	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by, among others, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, must be applied to interpret 
investment treaties. Second, and related, among the “relevant rules of international law 
applicable between the parties” referred to by this interpretation rule one finds all the 
customary norms expressing the concept of sovereignty in general international law. In other 
words, at the very least, such norms would “apply” in that they must be taken into account to 
ascertain de meaning of investment treaty provisions. This is perhaps another truism, but one 
that has not always been sufficiently integrated in the reasoning of investment tribunals, as I 
will show with respect to the police powers doctrine. Aside from Article 1, the Resolution 
mentions “the rights of States to pursue, in a non-discriminatory way, their public and 
regulatory purposes” (preamble) and the “need for the interpretation and development of the 
law” as a consideration justifying deviations from a consistent line of precedents (Article 2). 
None of these references clearly brings customary law to bear but they do highlight the 
importance of regulatory powers as well as of the need to develop the law on foreign 
investment regulation even when that requires disregarding a precedent. Overall, the 
Resolution does not clarify the relations between investment treaties and customary law but it 
states some principles as obvious, which could hardly be understood otherwise than as 
assigning some room for customary legal concepts even in the presence of treaties.  
Unlike the Resolution, the 2013 Report presented by the Rapporteur to the 18th 
Commission addressed the relation between investment treaties and customary law explicitly 
in paragraphs 10 to 27. This relation is envisaged from two perspectives. The first is 
introduced by the Rapporteur as follows: “the key and seminal question has been and still is 
whether the extremely numerous bilateral treaties on the protection of foreign investments, 
given their substantially homogeneous content, determined the creation of a body of 
customary international law”.11 
This question is subsequently explored in connection with the alleged emergence of a 
specialised body of law arising from the decisions of arbitral tribunals or with the appropriate 
interpretation of investment treaties, particularly by inter-State bodies or by tribunals deciding 
inter-State disputes. The analysis offered by the Rapporteur only touches upon the topic of 
this article tangentially, in paragraphs 12 and 13, when discussing the potential emergence of 
a specialised body of customary investment law: 
 
“[T]he most appropriate – and in any case legally correct – approach appears to be 
that of the full respect of the different clauses of the various applicable BITs. This 
is so also because these clauses would necessarily apply, not withstanding any 
possible differences with the alleged rules of customary law. Actually, the latter 
can always be derogated, with the limited exception of some procedural and 
substantive international peremptory norms […]. When international law is 
referred to in the interpretation and application of BITs, such reference should be 
made correctly and appropriately”. 
 
These two paragraphs implicitly convey the manner in which the Rapporteur conceives 
the application of customary law in an investment treaty context. Customary norms may be 
referred to interpret the treaty (application as interpretation) or as governing norms. In the 
latter case, they only apply if not derogated by treaty norms (lex specialis), which is, 
according to the Rapporteur, always possible except for peremptory norms (lex superior). The 
lex specialis and lex superior hypotheses constitute the second perspective from which the 	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interactions between customary law and investment treaties are approached in the Report. But 
before moving to this second perspective it is important to note one gap in this analysis, 
namely that customary norms may intervene also as governing norms for questions not (fully) 
addressed by investment treaties. Indeed, an investment treaty may include public emergency 
clauses and, yet, the customary necessity defence will still apply as a customary autonomous 
defence. Similarly, a treaty may contain a clause reserving environmental regulation and, yet, 
the police powers doctrine will also apply autonomously as a matter of customary law. This 
nuance may seem to be a minor point but it is, quite to the contrary, very important for the 
expression of sovereignty in foreign investment law. Losing sight of this nuance amounts to 
losing sight of the locus (general and customary) of sovereignty in international law.  
The second perspective, discussed in paragraphs 23 to 27 of the Report, frames the 
interactions between customary law and investment treaties through the lenses of the lex 
specialis and lex superior principles and, in doing so, it overlooks the aforementioned nuance. 
Paragraph 27 conveys this point: 
 
“A related problem is whether the alleged autonomy and speciality of BIT’s law 
would be maintained also in the presence of peremptory rules of international law 
(for instance, the procedural rule of due process, namely the equality of arms, and 
the substantive rules protecting the environment, human health and fundamental 
human rights in general, and the State’s basic sovereign rights). […] According 
to the Rapporteur, leaving aside some difficulties in precisely defining certain 
rules of jus cogens, the conclusion appears unavoidable that peremptory rules of 
international law should prevail and/or have precedence over both conventional 
and customary rules, in the matter of protection of foreign investments” (emphasis 
added). 
 
If customary norms can only operate as controlling norms for questions already covered 
by treaty norms, then their application will be conditioned on their higher hierarchy. The 
Rapporteur refers only to jus cogens in this regard but there may be other forms of lex 
superior, such as Article 103 of the United Nations Charter. Under this prism, as anticipated 
by the Rapporteur, the main difficulty will stem from the precise identification of superior 
norms. However, by placing the debate on this level, much of the expression of sovereignty is 
lost. There is no need for customary norms expressing sovereignty to be lex superior in 
respect of investment treaties. Such customary expressions apply together or in addition to 
treaties, as autonomous concepts specifically addressing questions not (fully) covered by 
treaties. If, instead, sovereignty were only given room when conveyed by a superior norm, 
then, the everyday regulatory duties of a State would have little chance of being shielded. As 
discussed next, during the codification process, some members of the 18th Commission 
expressed doubt – perhaps justifiably – as to the peremptory character of norms expressing 
“basic sovereign rights” or protecting objects such as the environment. 
After some initial discussions on the scope of the work at the Naples (2009) and Rhodes 
(2011) sessions of the IDI, the Rapporteur circulated a Questionnaire to prepare a meeting in 
Rome (June 2013) prior to the Tokyo session (September 2013) where the Resolution was 
adopted. The Questionnaire offers some useful insights into the materials used by the 
Rapporteur to prepare his final Report as well as the views expressed by some members of the 
18th Commission. Question 2 of the Questionnaire, entitled “The BITs as lex specialis”, was 
formulated as follows: 
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“a) Does a BIT, or even a series of BITs, represents a body of rules which are 
autonomous, as lex specialis, from other rules of general international law, which 
could not be used for interpreting or filling the possible lacunae of the BIT’s 
regulation? 
b) A related point is whether the above autonomy would be maintained also in the 
presence of peremptory rules of international law (for instance, the procedural 
rule on the equality of arms, and the substantive rules protecting fundamental 
human rights and those protecting States’ basic economic sovereign rights). 
c) An additional related point is whether the autonomy of investment law can be 
maintained, and/or with what possible qualifications, in the case that the BITs or 
other international instruments make express reference to international rules”. 
 
These questions received differing answers. 12  Most of them acknowledged that 
investment treaties do not create an autonomous regulatory regime and that customary 
international law (e.g., the rules on the interpretation of treaties or, more generally, the law of 
treaties and general international law) remained applicable. Yet, they also considered that 
BITs supersede customary norms with which they conflict except for peremptory norms, 
although the latter have virtually no role to play in investment disputes. On the third question, 
the answer pointed to the need to take into account other relevant rules for interpretation 
purposes. 
Comparing the questions with the answers is useful to determine at what juncture the 
understanding of the link between investment treaties and customary norms was framed in a 
way that excludes the autonomous application of customary concepts expressing sovereignty. 
The final Report responded, in fact, to this framing and, perhaps inadvertently, left this 
important question aside. In the following section, I will attempt to go back to the beginning 
and undertake this legal framing journey again but focusing on the hypothesis left unexplored 
by the work of the IDI. Given the limited scope of this article, I cannot conduct this inquiry 
for all or even most legal concepts capable of expressing the idea of sovereignty in foreign 
investment law. I will therefore limit myself to four basic concepts, namely the police powers 
doctrine, the necessity defence, countermeasures and transnational public policy. 
 
 
3. THE CUSTOMARY EXPRESSION OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMOUS 
APPLICATION 
 
3.1. The Supplementing Function of Customary Law 
 
Reference to customary law in investment arbitration is not a particularly controversial 
question. Tribunals routinely refer to the customary rules on the law of treaties, particularly 
on treaty interpretation, or to that on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. 
This is hardly surprising and does not call for additional comment. What is, instead, less clear 
is how exactly this reference operates. Excessive emphasis on treaties as lex specialis may 
obscure the fact that there are several ways in which customary norms may apply together 
with investment treaties. In the previous section I mentioned three ways: (i) to interpret treaty 
provisions; (ii) as governing norms superseding treaty provisions (either because of the lex 
superior principle or – potentially – as a lex specialis, e.g., if two States have developed a 	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bilateral custom on the application of a treaty); and (iii) as governing norms supplementing 
treaty provisions for questions not addressed by the latter. The work of the IDI focused on the 
first and second categories.  
One point of respectful disagreement that I have with the approach followed by the 
Rapporteur to frame the expression of sovereignty is precisely that such expression was 
placed under the second category. By doing so, this expression was confined to operating 
within the narrow and unwelcoming straitjacket of peremptory norms of international law. 
With the exception of some human rights provisions, it is unclear whether the other 
considerations identified by the Rapporteur, including “States’ basic sovereign rights” would 
qualify as peremptory norms or otherwise function as lex superior. It is possible that this may 
be the case, but one would have to target a specific norm and provide a fine-grained analysis 
of its hierarchy. However, category (ii) is neither the only nor the most suitable approach to 
understand how customary norms expressing sovereignty may apply. In both theory and 
practice, category (iii) provides a fuller understanding of the operation of customary norms. 
As stated by an arbitration tribunal in an award that has become a landmark decision in the 
development of “treaty” arbitration: 
 
“[I]t should be noted that the Bilateral Investment Treaty is not a self-contained 
closed legal system limited to provide for substantive material rules of direct 
applicability, but it has to be envisaged within a wider juridical context in which 
rules from other sources are integrated through implied incorporation methods, or 
by direct reference to certain supplementary rules, whether of international law 
character or of domestic law nature” (emphasis added).13 
 
Investment treaties or a specific set of investment norms within a given treaty may 
indeed operate as a lex specialis displacing customary law. But there are many matters not 
“specifically” regulated by investment treaties, where customary law continues to apply.  
In the quotation above the tribunal refers to “supplementary rules” in order to highlight 
that such rules come into play as governing norms for matters not addressed in the investment 
treaty. An obvious example concerns the customary rules on treaty interpretation and 
application codified in the VCLT, but the supplementing role has a wider scope. As noted by 
the tribunal in a recent award: 
 
“There are a few essential points to be made in this context. First, the 
interpretation and application of the BIT is governed by international law, as is 
any treaty, and the expropriation clause is, obviously, a key part of the BIT. 
Second, it may not be possible to consider the scope and content of the term 
‘expropriation’ in the BIT without considering customary and general principles 
of international law, as well as any other sources of international law in this area 
[…]. The BIT in this case, as in almost all cases, has no definition of 
‘expropriation’ within its text, nor does it contain guidelines that would assist the 
Tribunal in determining whether or not there has been a compensable taking of 
property. Expropriation has been and is now part of international law, and the 
change from dispute resolution under the system of diplomatic protection to 
investor-state arbitration has not modified that. It is true that BITs have become 	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the most reliable source of law in this area, as have the awards of ICSID, other 
investor-state tribunals acting under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and other 
modern-day tribunals, such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, state practice, and 
writings of scholars. But that is not inconsistent with the continuing relevance of 
customary and general principles of international law, at least as to BIT 
obligations that are silent as to scope and content, as well as any other sources of 
international law with respect to expropriation” (emphasis added).14 
 
An interesting feature of this quotation is that it raises a more general point regarding 
the supplementary function of customary law. Even if the matter is to some extent addressed 
in the treaty, one may not automatically conclude that the treaty provisions totally deprive 
customary law from any form of autonomous application. In the important Nicaragua case15 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stressed that customary and treaty rules (in casu the 
principles enshrined in Article 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter) may operate distinctly 
and autonomously, even when they have similar content. Specifically, incorporation into a 
treaty does not have the effect of “supplanting” the customary norm (as had been argued by 
the United States). The importance of this point warrants a reference in extenso to its 
articulation by the Court:  
 
“[E]ven if the customary norm and the treaty norm were to have exactly the same 
content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation of 
the customary norm into treaty-law must deprive the customary norm of its 
applicability as distinct from that of the treaty norm […]. There are a number of 
reasons for considering that, even if two norms belonging to two sources of 
international law appear identical in content, and even if the States in question are 
bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary 
international law, these norms retain a separate existence. This is so from the 
standpoint of their applicability. […] 178. A State may accept a rule contained in 
a treaty not simply because it favours the application of the rule itself, but also 
because the treaty establishes what that State regards as desirable institutions or 
mechanisms to ensure implementation of the rule […]. 179. It will therefore be 
clear that customary international law continues to exist and to apply, separately 
from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an 
identical content” (emphasis added).16 
 
This point is well known to any international lawyer and should normally not call for 
further discussion. For the purpose of analysing category (iii), this statement is useful to 
nuance the unqualified references to investment treaties as lex specialis that one finds in legal 
commentary.  
Summarising the foregoing observations, the customary concepts expressing 
sovereignty are best understood as supplementing investment treaties. This supplementary 
function is not a subordinated one. Customary norms may address questions on which an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Accession Mezzanine Capital L.P. and Danubius Kereskedohaz Vagyonkezelo v. Hungary, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/3, Decision on Respondents Objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5) of 16 January 2013, paras. 67-
68. 
15  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 (“Nicaragua case”), para. 177. 
16 Ibid., paras. 177-179. 
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investment treaty is totally or partially silent and, even when the treaty addresses much of a 
question, this is not to say that the customary norm is fully supplanted. This is important not 
only because investment treaties barely address the extent of a State’s regulatory powers 
explicitly but also because, when they do so (e.g., through reservations on public emergency 
or environmental regulatory powers) this is not to be considered as supplanting the customary 
norms expressing State sovereignty. In the next sections, I will analyse four examples of 
concepts that I see as customary expressions of sovereignty: the police powers doctrine (3.2); 
the necessity defence (section 3.3); the doctrine of countermeasures (section 3.4); and the 
protection of transnational public policy (section 3.5). I will refer to general aspects of these 
concepts only briefly. My analysis will focus on their operation as customary norms in 
parallel to investment treaties. 
 
 
3.2. The Police Powers Doctrine 
 
The police powers doctrine is widely recognised by investment arbitration tribunals. 
Given my own research interests, I have studied its operation mostly in connection with 
environmental protection, where several cases have recognised and applied this concept to 
shield regulatory action from investors’ claims.17 But its scope is, of course, much wider and 
the practice of investment tribunals provides several examples of cases where this concept has 
been discussed and sometimes applied to dispose of the claim.18  
The customary grounding of the police powers doctrine is unanimously recognised in 
the awards I have mentioned, either explicitly or implicitly (e.g., through a reference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003 (“Tecmed v Mexico”), para. 119 (“[t]he principle that the State’s 
exercise of its sovereign powers within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those 
subject to its powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable”); 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Award of 3 August 2005, part IV, 
Ch. D, para. 7 (“as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, 
which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment 
is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain 
from such regulation”); Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v. Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, Award of 2 August 2010 (“Chemtura v. Canada”), para. 266 (“[T]he Tribunal considers in any 
event that the measures challenged by the Claimant constituted a valid exercise of the Respondent’s police 
powers. As discussed in detail in connection with Article 1105 of NAFTA, the PMRA took measures within its 
mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by 
lindane for human health and the environment. A measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise 
of the State’s police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation”). 
18 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 13 September 2001, para. 
603; Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 16 
December 2002, paras. 103, 112; Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 
17 March 2006 (“Saluka v. Czech Republic”); BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Award of 
24 December 2007, para. 268; AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liability of 30 
July 2010, paras. 149-150; Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability 
of 27 December 2010, para. 197; Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award of 7 
July 2011, para. 145; El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, Award of 31 October 2011, paras. 236-241, 243; Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S., Biofarma, S.A.S., 
Arts et Techniques du Progres S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Award (Redacted) of 14 February 
2012, paras. 569-570, 584; SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Liability of 6 June 2012, paras. 396-401; TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of 
Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award of 19 December 2013, paras. 490-493. 
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“general international law” or otherwise). One oft-quoted paragraph recognising this doctrine 
appears in the award of the arbitration tribunal in the case Saluka v. Czech Republic: “the 
principle that a State does not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay 
compensation to a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general regulations that are 
‘commonly accepted as within the police powers of States’ forms part of customary law 
today”.19 
This reference is useful for a number of reasons. First, as already noted, this authority 
has been often referred to in subsequent arbitration awards as well as by the IDI in its 
discussion of expropriation. Second, the reference to the police powers doctrine in this case 
was not a mere obiter dictum; the doctrine was effectively applied to dispose of the relevant 
claim.20 Third, the award was unanimously rendered by an eminent tribunal, presided by the 
late Sir Arthur Watts.21 Fourth, and perhaps more interestingly for present purposes, the 
reasoning of the award on the relations between customary law and the applicable investment 
treaty is ambiguous. It therefore provides a suitable starting-point for the analysis of how the 
understanding of this relationship may influence the operation of the police powers doctrine. 
As previously noted, the police powers doctrine is grounded on customary international 
law and, as a result, there is no need for it to be explicitly provided for in a treaty. Yet, in the 
Saluka award, the tribunal seemed to suggest that the doctrine could only be applied if it had 
been incorporated into the applicable treaty: 
 
“The Tribunal acknowledges that Article 5 of the Treaty [a broad expropriation 
clause] in the present case is drafted very broadly and does not contain any 
exception for the exercise of regulatory power. However, in using the concept of 
deprivation, Article 5 imports into the Treaty the customary international law 
notion that a deprivation can be justified if it results from the exercise of 
regulatory actions aimed at the maintenance of public order” (emphasis added).22  
 
Taken out of context, this statement would be highly debatable. If the police powers 
rule has a customary basis, its application does not depend upon a clause incorporating it into 
the treaty, unless the treaty otherwise excludes it. For a directly relevant and widely 
recognised customary norm not to apply, there must be a lex specialis clearly excluding its 
application. However, the tribunal did not address the lex specialis question. Moreover, a 
relevant customary norm may continue to apply to shape the content of the applicable treaty 
provision. The tribunal seemed to adhere to this proposition – and therefore lift to some extent 
the ambiguity of its reasoning – when it referred, in the same paragraph, to Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT: “[i]n interpreting a treaty, account has to be taken of ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ – a requirement which the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held includes relevant rules of general customary 
international law” (emphasis added). 
It is, of course, correct that a customary norm may be taken into account to interpret a 
provision of an investment treaty (a hypothesis that would fall under category (i) of the 
taxonomy referred to in section 3.1). But the key point is different, namely that there is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Saluka v. Czech Republic, ibid., para. 262. 
20 Ibid., para. 265. 
21 The composition of the tribunal that rendered the award was as follows: Sir Arthur Watts (presiding 
arbitrator), Yves Fortier (claimant’s nomminee), and Prof. Peter Behrens (respondent’s nomminee). 
22 Saluka v. Czech Republic, cit. supra note 18, para. 254 (emphasis added). 
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legal reason to disregard a directly relevant customary norm which has not been specifically 
excluded by a treaty provision. 
In Saluka v. Czech Republic, the tribunal dismissed the expropriation claim brought by 
the investor. Yet, the ambiguity in its reasoning must be addressed because it is, in fact, quite 
representative of a conceptually debatable understanding of the relations between custom and 
treaty. The difference between disregarding a customary norm expressing sovereignty and 
admitting its autonomous application is indeed not a mere academic point. Recognising such 
difference is a condition for the customary expression of sovereignty in foreign investment 
disputes. I have discussed the specific legal implications of this change in perception 
elsewhere.23 My purpose in this article is only to flag this problem drawing the attention of 
commentators and practitioners to the need to further analyse and give effect to what I have 
called category (iii) and its wider implications for the expression of sovereignty in foreign 
investment law. 
 
 
3.3. The Customary Necessity Defence  
 
The customary necessity defence has been raised and, to a varying degree, addressed in 
several investment arbitration proceedings.24 To the extent they effectively address this 
defence, all these cases recognise the customary nature of the norm codified in Article 25 of 
the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.25 In this respect, they follow the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ under both the previous and the final version of the ILC Articles.26 There is no need to 
analyse in this article the operation of this defence in general, as this has already been done 
elsewhere, particularly in connection with the Argentine economic and social crisis of 2001-
2003.27 As with the police powers doctrine, my main focus will be on the relations between 
treaty and custom in this context. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See VIÑUALES, cit. supra note 2, pp. 331-343. 
24 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award of 12 May 
2005, paras. 316-331 (necessity), 353-378 (emergency clause); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Decision on Annulment of 25 September 2007, paras. 137-150; LG&E 
Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006, paras. 201-261; Enron and Ponderosa Assets v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award of 22 May 2007, paras. 314-342; Enron and Ponderosa Assets v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment of 30 July 2010, paras. 396-417; Sempra Energy 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award of 28 September 2007, paras. 356-391; Sempra 
Energy v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Annulment of 29 June 2010, paras. 
159-223; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award of 5 
September 2008, paras. 160-199, 231-236; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAgua 
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability of 
30 July 2010, para. 235-243; and Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on liability of 31 July 2010, paras. 257-271. 
25 ILC Articles, cit. supra note 6, Art. 25. 
26 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports, 
1997, p. 7, paras. 50-52; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 136, paras. 140-142. 
27 See, e.g., LEBEN, “L’état de nécessité dans le droit international de l’investissement”, Les Cahiers de 
l'arbitrage, 2003, No. 3, p. 47 ff.; VIÑUALES, “State of Necessity and Peremptory Norms in International 
Investment Law”, NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas, 2008, No. 14, p. 79 ff.; BURKE-WHITE 
and VON STADEN, “Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-
Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties”, Virginia Journal of International Law, 2008, p. 
307 ff.; SLOANE, “On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility”, AJIL, 2012, p. 447 ff. 
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Many of the investment cases assessing the necessity defence (those concerning the US-
Argentina BIT) had to deal with the combined operation of an emergency clause and the 
customary necessity defence. A noteworthy feature in this regard was the approach adopted 
by three tribunals to apply the stringent requirements of the customary necessity defence to 
assess the availability of a less demanding emergency clause in the applicable investment 
treaty.28 Aside from treating an emergency clause (which excludes some matters from the 
scope of the treaty) as applicable to the same situation as the necessity defence (which only 
comes into play once a matter covered by the treaty has been found in breach of a treaty 
provision), these tribunals disregarded the application of the lex specialis principle. Indeed, 
assuming that both the treaty clause and the necessity defence would operate to justify what 
would otherwise is a treaty breach, the former would displace the latter, at least for the 
matters specifically addressed by the treaty clause.  
The starting-point of the analysis must be the first of these three investment disputes, 
namely CMS v. Argentina,29 which influenced the solutions reached in two other cases, Enron 
v. Argentina30 and Sempra v. Argentina.31 The CMS award is also useful because, shortly after 
it was released, another tribunal reached an opposite conclusion in LG&E v. Argentina32 on 
the defences invoked by Argentina. Moreover, in September 2007, an Ad Hoc Committee 
constituted to review the CMS award severely criticised the reasoning of the tribunal on 
necessity.33 In CMS, Argentina argued that the measures challenged by the investor were 
covered by both the customary necessity defence and Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT (an 
emergency clause). The tribunal discussed the customary necessity defence first, concluding 
that it was not available in casu. It then moved to the analysis of the emergency clause in the 
treaty equating the conditions for its availability with those required by the customary 
defence. In this context, it noted that, in its review of the treaty clause, it had to “examine 
whether the state of necessity or emergency meets the conditions laid down by customary 
international law and the treaty provisions and whether it thus is or is not able to preclude 
wrongfulness”.34 This is perhaps the only paragraph of the award where the tribunal explicitly 
states how it approached the relations between the treaty clause and the customary defence, 
but there are several other paragraphs in the analysis of the treaty clause where the tribunal 
specifically addresses customary (not treaty) requirements. By way of illustration, the tribunal 
notes that it “must determine […] whether, as discussed in the context of Article 25 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility, the act in question does not seriously impair an essential 
interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists” (para. 357).  
Although the tribunal found that this requirement was met, the key consideration is that 
nothing in the treaty clause calls for the application of this requirement. 
An Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the former President of the ICJ, Judge Gilbert 
Guillaume, was entrusted the mandate to review the award. The Committee severely criticise 
the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal. On the question of the relations between treaty and 
custom, the Committee rightly observed: “the requirements under Article XI are not the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See, generally, HEATHCOTE, State of Necessity and International Law (PhD dissertation, Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Geneva, 2005). 
28 CMS v. Argentina, Award, cit. supra note 24, paras. 316-331, 353-378; Enron v. Argentina, Award, cit. 
supra note 24; and Sempra Energy v. Argentina, Award, cit. supra note 24. 
29 Cit. supra note 24, paras. 316-331, 353-378. 
30 Cit. supra note 24, paras. 314-342. 
31 Cit. supra note 24, paras. 159-223. 
32 Cit. supra note 24, paras. 201-216. 
33 CMS v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment, cit. supra note 24, para.146. 
34 CMS v. Argentina, cit. supra note 24, para. 374. 
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as those under customary international law as codified by Article 25, as the Parties in fact 
recognized during the hearing before the Committee. On that point, the Tribunal made a 
manifest error of law”.35  
From a broader perspective, the errors contained in the CMS award as well as in the two 
other decisions following this approach (which were subsequently annulled on this point)36 
raise a more fundamental consideration. If the body of investment treaties form indeed a so-
called “self-contained regime” and displace custom with accordance to the lex specialis 
principle, this reasoning should operate not only to constrain the scope of State sovereignty 
but also to preserve it when a treaty clause has been expressly included for that purpose.  
Even if one were to consider that the CMS tribunal referred to the necessity defence to 
interpret or supplement a treaty provision (categories (i) and (iii) in the taxonomy introduced 
in section 3.1), the analysis would still be debatable for at least two reasons. First, the 
necessity defence was not relevant to interpret the emergency clause because the two norms 
have different scopes of application. As explained by the Ad Hoc Committee, properly 
construed as a secondary norm, the necessity defence only intervenes when a breach of an 
international obligation has been found. But this inquiry presupposes that the measures 
challenged are not beyond the scope of the treaty as defined, inter alia, by Article XI. If a 
measure falls under the emergency clause, which the Committee characterised as a “threshold 
requirement”,37 then the treaty is not applicable to it and it could not possibly be breached. In 
turn, there is no breach capable of being justified by the necessity defence. Thus, there is no 
basis for applying the exacting requirements of the necessity defence (which seek to 
circumscribe exceptional circumstances under which a breach can be redeemed) to a clause 
explicitly exempting some measures from the protection granted by the treaty. The second 
reason why a conflation of the treaty and customary requirements is an error of law concerns 
the actual contents and operation of customary law. Assuming the emergency clause can be 
properly characterised as an exception (and not a carve-out, as Article XI), then the 
requirements of the necessity defence would still not be applicable either as interpretive 
guidance or as a supplement addressing matters left unaddressed by the clause. This is 
because applying such more stringent requirements would amount to a restrictive 
interpretation of a treaty clause that expresses sovereignty, which would be inconsistent with 
the customary rule that limitations of sovereignty are not to be presumed.38 Even if this rule 
were no longer in force in contemporary international investment law, which is arguable, a 
conflation of the two norms would still be inconsistent with a neutral interpretation. 
As with the police powers doctrine, only through a very debatable line of reasoning 
(characterising emergency clauses as exceptions, then ignoring the lex specialis principle, 
then ignoring the presumption against limitations of sovereignty, and then ignoring a neutral 
interpretation) would it be possible to assert the application of the necessity requirements to 
an emergency treaty clause. Instead, a proper application of the law would consist in 
analysing separately the two norms, which target different situations. In this separate 
application, the customary necessity defence would operate autonomously according to its 
own requirements. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 CMS v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment, cit. supra note 24, para. 130. 
36 Sempra v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment, cit. supra note 24; Enron v. Argentina, Decision on 
Annulment, cit. supra note 24. 
37 CMS v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment, cit. supra note 24, para. 129. 
38 On the authority of this rule see supra note 7. 
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3.4. The Doctrine of Countermeasures  
 
Aside from the necessity defence, other customary defences arising from the law on 
State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts may also have a bearing on investment 
disputes. One example concerns breaches of international law justified under the doctrine of 
countermeasures. In at least three cases,39 this circumstance precluding wrongfulness codified 
in Article 22 of the ILC Articles was raised in investment arbitration as a potential defence 
justifying measures with an adverse impact on investors. The three tribunals recognised the 
customary grounding of the countermeasures defence40 and discussed its relationship with the 
investment protection standards in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA. For present purposes, two main 
questions must be addressed, namely the extent to which the customary regime on 
countermeasures may be excluded as a result, on the one hand, of the NAFTA’s regulation of 
countermeasures and, on the other hand, of the nature of investment protection standards. 
The first question was discussed in ADM v. Mexico in connection with a tax on soft 
drinks and syrups using any sweeteners other than sugar cane. The claimant, a producer of a 
sweetener (high fructose corn syrup or HFCS) affected by the measure, argued that the tax 
was in breach of the protections afforded to investors by Chapter 11 of the NAFTA. The 
respondent referred, as part of its defence, to the customary regime on countermeasures, 
arguing that the tax was a legitimate response to a breach of the NAFTA by the United States, 
the investor’s home State. The tribunal analysed the question whether the NAFTA contained 
a specific regime on countermeasures that would operate as a lex specialis excluding the 
application of the customary regime. It reasoned that, despite a reference in Article 2019 
(Chapter 20) of the NAFTA to countermeasures, Chapter 11 neither authorised nor prohibited 
the use of countermeasures. As a result, the customary regime on countermeasures remained 
applicable: 
 
“Chapter Eleven neither provides nor specifically prohibits the use of 
countermeasures. Therefore, the question of whether the countermeasures defence 
is available to the Respondent is not a question of lex specialis, but of customary 
international law […]. Under customary international law, ‘[…] the wrongfulness 
of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards 
another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a 
countermeasure […]’ (Article 22 of the ILC Articles). Countermeasures may 
constitute a valid defence against a breach of Chapter Eleven insofar as the 
Respondent State proves that the measure in question meets each of the conditions 
required by customary international law, as applied to the facts of the case […]. 
The only instance in which the NAFTA refers to countermeasures is under Article 
2019. Under this provision, non-compliance with a decision rendered in a Chapter 
Twenty State-to-State arbitration can lead to penalties. In the event of such non-
compliance, the complaining State can retaliate by taking countermeasures 
suspending tariff concessions or other obligations under the treaty. Outside Article 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award of 21 November 2007 (“ADM v. Mexico”); Corn Products 
International Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility of 15 
January 2008 (“Corn Products v. Mexico”); and Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award of 18 September 2009 (“Cargill v. Mexico”). 
40 ADM v. Mexico, ibid., paras. 125-126; Corn Products v. Mexico, ibid., para. 145; Cargill v. Mexico, 
ibid., para. 420. 
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2019, the NAFTA makes no express provision for countermeasures. Accordingly, 
the default regime under customary international law applies to the present 
situation […]. The Tribunal therefore agrees with Respondent that 
countermeasures may serve as a defence under a Chapter Eleven case, as this is a 
matter not specifically addressed in Chapter Eleven, but valid under customary 
international law if certain conditions are met” (emphasis added).41 
 
Although the tribunal eventually concluded that the requirements for the adoption of 
countermeasures were not fully met, this case provides a clear illustration of how a customary 
defence (other than necessity) may perform a supplementary function completing the law 
applicable to a dispute in the absence of exclusion by the provisions of the relevant treaty. 
A different but related question is whether the customary regime on countermeasures 
would be precluded from operating as a defence against a claim for breach of Chapter 11 
because of the nature of the standards provided therein. In two other cases arising from the 
same tax imposed by Mexico and affecting producers of HFCS, the answer to this question 
differed from the position of the tribunal in ADM v. Mexico. In Corn Products v. Mexico, the 
tribunal held that the doctrine of countermeasures concerned inter-State relations and, 
therefore, could not operate in an investor-State context: 
 
“The Tribunal has concluded, however, that the doctrine of countermeasures, 
devised in the context of relations between States, is not applicable to claims 
under Chapter XI of the NAFTA. Those claims are brought by investors, not by 
States. A central purpose of Chapter XI of the NAFTA was to remove such claims 
from the inter-State plane and to ensure that investors could assert rights directly 
against a host State. The Tribunal considers that, in the context of such a claim, 
there is no room for a defence based upon the alleged wrongdoing not of the 
claimant but of its State of nationality, which is not a party to the proceedings 
[…]. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the investor, such as CPI, has rights 
of its own under Chapter XI of the NAFTA. As such, it is a third party in any 
dispute between its own State and another NAFTA Party and a countermeasure 
taken by that other State against the State of nationality of the investor cannot 
deprive that investor of its rights. To revert to the two different examples given by 
the ILC in its Commentary on Article 49(1), this is a case involving the rights of a 
third party and not merely its interests. Mexico owed obligations to CPI under 
Chapter XI of NAFTA which were separate from the obligations it owed to the 
United States under the NAFTA as a whole. Even if the doctrine of 
countermeasures could operate to preclude the wrongfulness of the HFCS tax vis-
à-vis the United States (and, for the reasons given below, the Tribunal makes no 
comment on that question), they cannot do so vis-à-vis CPI” (emphasis added).42 
 
The tribunal thus excluded the application of the customary doctrine of 
countermeasures not because of an argument based on the lex specialis principle but on the 
basis of the outright inapplicability of the doctrine with respect to third parties, including 
investors. This is because of the nature of the investment protection standards contained in 
Chapter 11, which, according to the tribunal, must be treated as “rights”. Conversely, the 	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42 Corn Products v. Mexico, cit. supra note 39, paras. 161, 176. 
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tribunal admitted that the doctrine of countermeasures could operate to shield the same 
measures vis-à-vis the United States. One may ask, in this regard, whether a measure affecting 
foreign investors may under some circumstances be justified by the customary doctrine on 
countermeasures. The answer depends on how the situation is framed legally. The very same 
facts triggering an investment dispute may also (or alternatively) give rise to diplomatic 
protection, in which case the countermeasures defence may be available against the claim of 
the home State. As noted by the tribunal in Cargill v. Mexico: 
 
“The Tribunal agrees with Respondent that if a State, through diplomatic 
protection, were to espouse the claims of its nationals damaged by a legitimate 
countermeasure, then that countermeasure would preclude the wrongfulness of the 
act that otherwise would have entailed State responsibility and the claims would 
be denied. In the case of diplomatic espousal, however, the claim is owned by the 
espousing State and the espousing State is the named party. Moreover, the 
operative paragraph of the resulting award reciting the decision of the tribunal 
names the espousing State, and not the national”.43 
 
Thus, according to Corn Products and Cargill tribunals, depending on whether 
investment protection standards are characterised as obligations owed to the other contracting 
State or to its investors, this customary defence would either apply or not. Interestingly, the 
ADM tribunal referred to the specificity of Chapter 11 for a clearly different purpose, namely 
to consider that Article 2019 (Chapter 20) could not operate as a lex specialis displacing the 
customary regime. 
The two approaches are not contradictory. Recognising the difference between chapters 
11 and 20 may be sufficient to conclude that a provision in Chapter 20 is not a lex specialis 
for claims under Chapter 11 and, yet, this is not to say that the customary regime is 
inapplicable to such claims. The question of the nature of investment disciplines is still 
debated. The distinction between obligations owed to other States and obligations owed to 
investors may not be a sufficient basis for excluding the operation of the doctrine of 
countermeasures. It would be difficult to argue that the exceptio non adimplenti contractus,44 
the synallagmatic character of which is comparable to that of the doctrine of countermeasures, 
could not suspend the rights of foreign investors. In addition, determining whether a treaty 
provision provides “rights” to investors should require a more detailed analysis of how the 
relevant provision is formulated. Thus, the inter-State character of the doctrine of 
countermeasures does not, of necessity, exclude its operation from investor-State disputes 
altogether. In all events, this doctrine provides a good example of a matter governed only or 
mostly by customary law as well as of its potential application as a supplementary norm. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Cargill v. Mexico, cit. supra note 39, para. 424. 
44 Article 60(1) of the VCLT, cit. supra note 10, provides that “[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by 
one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its 
operation in whole or in part”. Paragraph 3(b) of this provision adds that “[t]he violation of a provision essential 
to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty”. It is generally recognised that the basic principle 
underpinning this article is part of general international law, although some details may have to be considered as 
progressive development. See VILLIGER, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Leiden, 2009, p. 730 ff., commentary ad Article 60 (paras. 28-29, stating “[i]n sum, it is doubtful whether Article 
60 as a whole is declaratory of customary law. Only para. 1 on bilateral treaties presents a clear and well 
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3.5. Transnational Public Policy 
 
The concept of good faith in international law is as vast and difficult to pinpoint as 
sovereignty itself.45 Out of its many legal expressions, some overlap with the expressions of 
sovereignty. Indeed, a necessary component of sovereignty is the ability of States to ensure 
the respect of fundamental values and public morals. Profound encroachments on good faith 
amount to encroachments on ordre public (or public policy) and, more precisely, on the “vital 
interests […] of a broader, regional or universal, international community”. The latter 
expression is borrowed from the landmark study of the late Professor Pierre Lalive on what he 
called “ordre public international” or “transnational public policy”.46 Lalive characterised this 
concept by reference to a significant number of domestic precedents: 
 
“From the preceding presentation, which did not attempt to be exhaustive, one 
thing at least seems clear: in an increasing number of cases, a national judge, 
although a State organ having the function to state and apply the law of a 
particular State and to ensure the respect of its fundamental principles (in 
particular by means of the traditional concept of external public policy) has not 
hesitated to recognize and give effect to a wider notion, more international or 
perhaps supranational, of public policy, based on the vital interests not only of the 
national community to which the judge belongs but also of a broader, regional or 
universal, international community”.47 
 
On this basis, he argued that international arbitrators, who do not have a domestic ordre 
public, should a fortiori recognise a concept of transnational public policy setting 
fundamental limits on the type of claims and conduct that may be tolerated in international 
business transactions: 
 
“[I]f judges have not hesitated to accept the idea of transnational public policy, 
international arbitrators by their very function and, let it be repeated, so to speak a 
fortiori, (a) could do the same and (b) should be naturally inclined to do the same, 
in order to reach practical conclusions, either negative (setting aside the normally 
applicable law or rules), or positive (imperative application, by priority, of certain 
superior and fundamental norms or principles essential in the law of international 
trade). In both cases this resort to transnational public policy should aim at 
protecting certain of the essential values and interests of the international 
community (of businessmen and States)”.48 
 
Investment arbitration tribunals have also recognised this concept. 49 In a well-known 
case against Kenya relating to acts of corruption in securing an investment scheme, the 
tribunal noted indeed that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See KOLB, La bonne foi en droit international public. Contribution à l’étude des principes du droit 
international, Paris, 2000. 
46 LALIVE, “Ordre public transnational (ou réellement international) et arbitrage international”, Revue de 
l’arbitrage, 1986, p. 329 ff. An English translation of this study appeared as LALIVE, “Transnational (or Truly 
International) Public Policy and International Arbitration”, ICCA Congress Series, 1987, No. 3, p. 257 ff. 
47 Ibid., para. 97. 
48 Ibid., para. 102.  
49 SCHREUER, MALINTOPPI, REINISCH and SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 2nd ed. 
Cambridge, 2009, pp. 566-567. 
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“The concept of public policy (‘ordre public’) is rooted in most, if not all, legal 
systems. Violation of the enforcing State’s public policy is grounds for refusing 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and awards […]. In this 
respect, a number of legislatures and courts have decided that a narrow concept of 
public policy should apply to foreign awards. This narrow concept is often 
referred as ‘international public policy’ (‘ordre public international’). Although 
this name suggests that it is in some way a supra-national principle, it is in fact no 
more than domestic public policy applied to foreign awards and its content and 
application remains subjective to each State […]. The term ‘international public 
policy,’ however, is sometimes used with another meaning, signifying an 
international consensus as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct 
that must be applied in all fora” (emphasis added).50 
 
As with the other general international law concepts discussed in previous sections, it is 
important to clarify the relations between the concept of transnational public policy and 
investment treaty provisions. 
Many investment treaties contain so-called “legality clauses”, namely clauses that 
condition the protection afforded by the treaty to the legality of the investment under 
domestic law. 51  The effects of these clauses have received some attention from 
commentators.52 Here, I will only refer to such effects to the extent useful for the analysis of 
the interaction between legality clauses and the concept of transnational public policy. An 
important case in this regard is Hamester v. Ghana, where the tribunal made the following 
statement: 
 
“The Tribunal considers, as was stated for example in Phoenix v. Czech Republic, 
that: ‘States cannot be deemed to offer access to the ICSID dispute settlement 
mechanism to investments not made in good faith’. An investment will not be 
protected if it has been created in violation of national or international principles 
of good faith; by way of corruption, fraud, or deceitful conduct; or if its creation 
itself constitutes a misuse of the system of international investment protection 
under the ICSID Convention. It will also not be protected if it is made in violation 
of the host State’s law (as elaborated, e.g., by the tribunal in Phoenix) […]. These 
are general principles that exist independently of specific language to this effect 
in the Treaty” (emphasis added).53 
 
The operation of these international principles of good faith had already been 
recognised by other investment tribunals. 54 What the Hamester tribunal adds is the explicit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 World Duty Free Company Limited v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award of 4 
October 2006, paras. 138-139. 
51 JOUBIN-BRET, “Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection”, in REINISCH 
(ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford, 2008, pp. 9-28. 
52 See, e.g., VIÑUALES, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law, Cambridge, 2012, 
pp. 96-100; and DOUGLAS, “The Plea of Illegality in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, ICSID Review – Foreign 
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53 Gustav FW Hamester GnbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award of 
18 June 2010, paras. 123-124. 
54 See Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, 
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confirmation that such principles operate autonomously, irrespective of their incorporation 
into a treaty clause. More specifically, they operate independently from a treaty clause. This 
observation requires some clarification. 
Normally, investment treaties do not refer to transnational public policy. But, as already 
mentioned, they provide for a legality clause either in the definition of protected investments 
or elsewhere. Such clauses are broader than the concept of transnational public policy as 
many situations that are illegal under the law referred to by the clause (normally the domestic 
law of the host State) would not necessarily be contrary to transnational public policy. 
However, legality clauses are often formulated to target the “making” of an investment (the 
so-called “initial” illegality) and not its “operation” (the so-called “subsequent” illegality). 
Investments made illegally are not protected and a tribunal seized of the matter must reject the 
claim without proceeding to the merits (either as a matter of jurisdiction or of admissibility).55 
As for subsequent illegality, it is understood as a defence on the merits of the case.56 One 
question that arises at this point is whether there is any room left for transnational public 
policy that would not be covered by legality clauses. Aside from the fact that transnational 
public policy might, in cases where it seeks to protect a value enshrined in a peremptory 
norm, prevail over treaty clauses, there is also some room for this concept to perform a 
supplementing function. The highly reprehensible character of the conduct prohibited by 
transnational public policy calls for the rejection of a claim before reaching the merits (again, 
whether on jurisdictional or admissibility grounds) even if the illegality arose after the making 
of the investment. How could one admit that a tribunal may assert jurisdiction to hear a claim 
relating to an investment vehicle set up in accordance with all the applicable regulations but 
then operated for human or drug trafficking? This is a hypothesis where the somewhat rigid 
distinction between initial and subsequent illegality made in connection with legality clauses 
should be set aside, precisely because the concept of transnational public policy would come 
into operation. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The foregoing observations are only intended to add a word of caution regarding the 
understanding of the relations between treaty and custom in foreign investment law. My 
views can be summarised in three main points.  
First, there is much more to the relations between customary international law and 
investment treaties that the debate over so-called “special regimes” or the lex specialis 
principle. This is something that the Rapporteur clearly highlighted in his Report and 
questionnaire, although the Resolution did not take a clear position on this debate. The oft-
quoted reference to the special character of bilateral investment treaties made by in ICJ ruling 
on preliminary objections in the Diallo case57  cannot be considered as endorsing the 	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simplistic view that investment treaties operate a blanket displacement of customary 
international law. In fact, the very award on which the surge in treaty arbitration is based, 
namely AAPL v. Sri Lanka, states the opposite view, and the constant references in investment 
arbitration to the customary rules on the law of treaties or on State responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts are a clear confirmation that, in practice, resort to customary 
international law is both necessary and useful. 
Second, the relations between treaty and custom must be elucidated in more detail. A 
fine-grained chart of this complex topography is required to capture the subtleties of this 
relationship. The distinction I used in this article between three main ways in which 
customary norms may apply together with investment treaties – as interpretive tools (category 
(i)), as governing norms superseding treaty provisions (category (ii)), and as supplementing 
norms governing questions not covered by treaty provisions (category (iii)) – are only flagged 
here as a basis for further discussion and refinement. In fact, the travaux préparatoires of the 
IDI looked into two of them (categories (i) and (ii)) although in less detail than one would 
have wished. More importantly, I respectfully disagree with the Rapporteur on the way he 
framed the expression of regulatory powers. A concept as broad and encompassing as 
sovereignty cannot be adequately accommodated either within a specific investment 
protection standard (expropriation) or under the abovementioned category (ii). Most of the 
norms expressing different aspects of sovereignty have no peremptory character and could not 
prevail over treaty clauses as a lex superior. A key consideration in this regards lies, in my 
view, in a fuller understanding of category (iii). 
Third, as I mentioned in the introduction to this article, most legal or actionable 
expressions of sovereignty in international law are general in scope (non-branch specific) and 
customary in nature. Failure to recognise and understand the operation of category (iii) 
amounts to depriving such legal concepts and, thereby, sovereignty of a proper role in foreign 
investment law. In my analysis, I identified a number of conceptual ambiguities in the 
application of concepts such as the police powers doctrine, the customary necessity defence, 
the doctrine of countermeasures, and the concept of transnational public policy. The operation 
of these concepts is still debated because many conceptual issues need to be solved. Given the 
importance of calibrating the legitimate interests of investors with States’ rights and duties to 
regulate, this is an area where more detached and detailed scholarship would be useful. Policy 
arguments are a major driver for reflexion on an issue such as the proper role of regulatory 
powers in foreign investment law. But at some point it must give way to a more technical 
understanding of the actionable concepts expressing sovereignty. Law is a language and, 
curiously, the political concept of sovereignty is still in need of adequate translation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of companies and the rights of their shareholders, 
and the settlement of the associated disputes, are essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for 
the protection of foreign investments […] and also by contracts between States and foreign investors. In that 
context, the role of diplomatic protection somewhat faded, as in practice recourse is only made to it in rare cases 
where treaty régimes do not exist or have proved inoperative”). But the Court adds, in para. 90, that “[t]he fact 
invoked by Guinea that various international agreements, such as agreements for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investments and the Washington Convention, have established special legal régimes governing 
investment protection, or that provisions in this regard are commonly included in contracts entered into directly 
between States and foreign investors, is not sufficient to show that there has been a change in the customary 
rules of diplomatic protection; it could equally show the contrary”. 
